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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs.-
PETE CASTILLO, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
11447 
RTATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Pete Castillo, appeals from a judg-
ment of conviction of assault with a deadly weapon and 
from the trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was chaged by information with the crime 
of assault with a deadly weapon and was tried by a jury 
which returned a verdict of guilty. Appellant's motion 
for a new trial was denied and appellant was sentenced 
to the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term pro-
vidPd by law. 
2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment of convic-
tion, or in the alterantive, reversal of the order denying 
the motion for new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At 7 o'clock on the morning of March 12, 1968, ap1wl-
lant went to the home of his former wife to speak with 
her personally regarding his anticipated departure from 
the state. Upon his arrival, he was met at the door h:-· l1i~ 
ex-wife's brother, Santana Gonzales (RII. 5). Gonzal('" 
first refused to allo-w appellant to talk with Mrs. Castillo, 
but then vrns persuaded to stPp into a hallway while H]J-
pellant talked with her (RI. 7). After about five rninnfr~. 
Gonzales returned (RI. 8). There is conflict in thP frsti-
mony as to the €'vents ·which subsequently transpired. Mr~. 
Castillo testified that appellant stood up, pulled a knifr 
out of his pocket, and attacked Gonzales, wheren1ion ~111' 
interwned, grahhPd for the knife and was stabbed (Hl. 
9-10). Appellant, howeyer, testified that Gonzales rdnl'll-
ed with a stick and hit appellant in the head several tirnes; 
appellant then pushPd Gonzales away, when•npon <loll-
zales attackf'd app<'llant with a knife. Appt>llant sulHlt;(•d 
Gonzales and lPft the ho11se (RI.14-15). Appellant tl'sri-
fied that h<• did not rm1emh<'r th0 detaib of the :,;tn 1 1·:~.>;l1• 
or tlw manner in \\'hich Mrs. Castillo was injured (Rl. l~J). 
Ap1wllant's t(•stimon~- l'<'!;·ardi11µ: the lJPating- which Cm:-
-..,. 
i 
' 
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zalcs inflicted upon him was corroborated by Officer 
Clark's testimony that when he saw appellant a short 
time after the incident, appellant had wounds on his 
hands, leg and head (RI. 60). In addition, there was sub-
stantial testimony that appellant and Gonzales had dis-
played mutual hostility prior to March 12, 1968, stemming 
from Gonzales' interference with appellant's family af-
fairs (RI 17, 34). Hffwever, despite this testimony 
strongly indicating an attack by Gonzales upon appellant, 
the trial court refused appllant's requested instructions 
relating to his theory of the case that he was acting in self-
defense when Mrs. Castillo was injured. Appellant's 
timely exceptions to the refusal of these instructions were 
properly entered in the record (RII. 31). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED PREJUDICIALLY IN RE-
FUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY AS TO APPELLANT'S 
THEORY OF THE CASE. 
It is appellant's theory in the case at bar that at the 
time Mrs. Castillo was stabbed, appellant was def ending 
himself against an attack by Gonzales, so that the stab-
bing of Mrs. Castillo, who intervened in an attempt to stop 
the altercation, ·was purely an accident. Thus, there was 
neypr the requisite intent on the part of appellant to do 
hodily harm to Mrs. Castillo. There was substantial evi-
rl<'nce in support of this theory, yet the trial court re-
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fused to instruct the jury accordingly. It is submitted 
that this constituted prejudicial error. 
A case directly in point is State v. Harris, 58 Utah 
331, 199 Pac. 145 (1921). There, the defendant had been 
convicted of second-degree murder. At trial, the def end-
ant himself testified that thedecedent had drawn a gun 
immediately before defendant shot and killed the deced-
ent. Despite the testimony, the trial court refused to in-
struct the jury as to self-defense. On appeal, the judgment 
of conviction was reversed on the ground that under 
the evidence, defendant was entitled to full and fair in-
structions on the subject of self-defense. Similarly, in 
State v. Evans, 74 Utah 389, 279 P. 950 (1929), invol\·ing 
a conviction of burglary, it was held that the trial court's 
failure fully to instruct the jury as to defendant's tlwory 
of the case constituted prejudicial error requiring n·-
venml and the grant of a new trial. 
In tlw case at har, appellant by his own testimony 
offered proof that he ·was acting in self-defense at tlw tillH' 
Mrs. Castillo was stabbed. While it is clear that f'Vf'll 
amwllant's testimony standing alone would be suff;cient 
to require that the trial court instruct the jury regarding' 
self-de>fense, State 1;. Harris, supra, the> re was addi tio11al 
testimon~- by Officer Clark which indicated that appel!m1t 
had indeed sustained a ~wve>re lwating. Clearly, th;~, 
testimony corrol10ratPd aprwllant's version of the> in('i-
<1Pnt. 'l'aln .. n tog-ether, tlit> i('stirnon~Y of appellant aml <il' 
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Officer Clark constituted a snshtantial quantum of pro-
hative evidence on the theory of self-defense. According-
ly, the jury should have been instructed fully and fairly, 
in concrete rather than ahstract terms, State v. Dewey, 
41 Utah 538, 127 P. 275 (1912), regarding this theory. 
The trial court's refusal so to instruct the jury was mani-
fest error. 
CONCLUSION 
There was adduced at appellant's trial substantial 
(:yidPnce that appellant was acting in self-defense at the 
time Mrs. Castillo was injured. This evidence entitled ap-
pellant to jury instructions fully explaining the appli-
cable law of self-defense. Despite that such instructions 
were requested, the trial court refused so to instruct the 
jury. The refusal clearly was prejudicial error, and the 
judgment should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JAY V. BARNEY 
231 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Appellant 
